WHO CAN SUE WHOM FOR WHAT

By Iain D. Johnston, General Counsel, Waubonsee Community College

Five Main Federal Statutes

Title VII (42 U.S.C. Section 2000e)

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. Section 620)

Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. Section 12101)

Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983)

Section 1981 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981)

Procedural Issues

Exhaustion of Administrative remedies

A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII, ADEA and ADA, but need not exhaust administrative remedies for claims under Sections 1983 and 1981. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963).

Charging Process

A plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the appropriate governmental agency before bringing a claim under Title VII, ADEA or ADA in federal court. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. Section 626(d).

Where to File Charge

Illinois is a deferral state; meaning that there is a corresponding state-law and agency that prohibits similar conduct. Accordingly, in many deferral states, such as Illinois, the state agency - in Illinois, the Illinois Department of Human Rights - enters into a work-share agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Sofferin v. American Airlines, 923 F.2d 552, 559 n.10 (7^th Cir. 1991). Pursuant to a work-share agreement, Illinois has designated an agent at the EEOC to receive certain discrimination complaints on behalf of the state administrative agency. See Hong v. Children's Memorial Hospital, 936 F.2d 967, 968-69 (7^th Cir. 1991). Once a complaint is filed with the EEOC, pursuant to the work-share agreement, the state's jurisdiction over the charge is instantaneously, constructively terminated. Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 814 (7^th Cir. 1991).

Specificity of Charge

As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in the administrative charge against the employer. Cheek v. Western & Southern Life Insurance, 31 F.3d 497, 499 (7^th Cir. 1994). The claims filed in a suit must be like or reasonably related to the charges filed with the EEOC or the IDHR. Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104 (7^th Cir. 1992). Because most EEOC charges are completed by laypersons rather than by lawyers, a plaintiff need not allege in a charge each and every fact that combines to form the basis of each claim in the plaintiff's complaint. Cheek v. Western & Southern Life Insurance, 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7^th Cir. 1994). At a minimum, the charge and the complaint must describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals. Cheek v. Western & Southern Life Insurance, 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7^th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment not reasonably inferred from allegations of sexual discrimination).

Amending the Charge

An untimely amendment that alleges an entirely new theory of recovery does not relate back to a timely filed original charge. Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 575 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Time for Filing Charge

In Illinois, a person has 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory conduct to file a charge with the EEOC. Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707 (7^th Cir. 1995); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e); 29 U.S.C. Section 626(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. Section 12117(a) (ADA refers back to provisions of Title VII); Huels v. Exxon Coal, 121 F.3d 1047, 1049 (7^th Cir. 1997) (ADA); see also Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226, 1230-31 (7^th Cir. 1987) (need not file charge with IDHR within 180 days to obtain benefit of filing complaint within 300 days). The 300 days begins to run when the employee is notified of the adverse employment decision. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1980); Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley, 745 F.2d 407, 411 (7^th Cir. 1984). The proper focus for determining whether a complaint was timely filed is when the alleged discriminatory acts took place, not on the time at which the consequences of those acts become most painful. Huels v. Exxon Coal, 121 F.3d 1047, 1050 (7^th Cir. 1997) (ADA). The failure to file a charge within 300 days renders the complaint untimely. Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, 827 F.2d 163, 165-66 (7^th Cir. 1987) aff'd 490 U.S. 900 (1989).

However, the filing deadline may be tolled for equitable reasons. Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley, 745 F.2d 407, 410 (7^th Cir. 1984). Equitable tolling applies when a plaintiff, despite the exercise of due diligence and through no fault of his own, cannot determine the information essential to bringing the complaint. Soignier v. American Board of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 553 (7^th Cir. 1996). Additionally, a plaintiff may attempt to extend the filing deadline by alleging a continuing violation. The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff to get relief for a time-barred act by linking it with an act that is within the limitations period. For purposes of the limitations period, courts treat such a combination as one continuous act that ends within the limitations period. Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7^th Cir. 1992).

For a discussion of the distinction between the discovery rule (meaning when the employee learns of the adverse employment decision) and equitable tolling, see Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 (7^th Cir. 1995).

Right-to-Sue Letter

Within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter, the complainant must file a complaint in the district court. See St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314 (7^th Cir. 1984); 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. Section 12117(a) (ADA refers back to provisions of Title VII). As the 300-day provision, the requirement that the complaint must be filed within 90 days from receiving a right-to-sue letter is subject to equitable modification; it is a condition precedent, not jurisdictional. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 470 (7^th Cir. 1991); cf. Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226, 1230-31 (7^th Cir. 1987).

Parties

Proper Plaintiffs

Generally, employees are proper plaintiffs, and an employee is defined as a person employed by an "employer." 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(f); 42 U.S.C. Section 630(f). However, the language of the statutes provides remedies for a broader range of individuals. For example, "employees" can mean former employees for purposes of retaliation claims. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). Under Title VII, a person claiming to be aggrieved may file a charge. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(b). Under the ADEA, any person aggrieved may bring a civil action. 29 U.S.C. Section 626(c)(1). Under the ADA, any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability may file suit. 42 U.S.C. Section 12117.

Proper Defendants

For Title VII, ADEA and ADA, only the employer is liable. There is no individual liability under these statutes. See Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.2d 50, 52 n.2 (7^th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7^th Cir. 1995). Only the employer can be liable. EEOC v. AIC, 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7^th Cir. 1995) (ADA). Generally, parties not named in the administrative charge may not be sued unless they received adequate notice of the charge and were able to participate in the conciliation process. Vakaria v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 824 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill. 1993).

Under Title VII, an employer is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e (b). Under the ADEA, an employer is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty (20) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 29 U.S.C. Section 630. Under the ADA, an employer is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. Section 12111(5)(A).

The leading case in the Seventh Circuit for determining who or what qualifies as an "employer" is Rogers v. Sugar Tree Products, 7 F.3d 577 (7^th Cir. 1993); see also Sharpe v. Jefferson Distributing Co., 148 F.3d 676 (7^th Cir. 1998).

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against States and State agencies under Title VII claims, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), or ADEA claims, Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761 (7^th Cir. 1998); or claims under the ADA, Erickson v. Board of Governors, 1998 WL 748277 (N.D.Ill.) (September 30, 1998, Nordberg, J.).

For Sections 1983 and 1981, only "persons" can be defendants. Therefore, States or State agencies are not proper defendants. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Also, States and State agencies are entitled to 11^th Amendment immunity. Kroll v. Board of Trustees, 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7^th Cir. 1991). Local governments such as counties and municipalities can be "persons" subjecting them to liability if they have a policy or custom that violates a plaintiff's rights. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Private individuals can be sued if they participated in a concerted activity with the public employer. Leahy v. Board of Trustees, 912 F.2d 917, 921 (7^th Cir. 1990).

Causes of Action

Title VII

Generally, to make a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, plaintiffs must show that (1) they were a member of a protected class; (2) they performed the job satisfactorily; (3) they were subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who were not in the plaintiffs' class received more favorable treatment. Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 746 (7^th Cir. 1994). However, it is important to remember that Title VII provides for a cause of action based upon disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(k).

Constructive Discharge

To state a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff needs to show that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been compelled to resign. Moreover, unlawful discrimination must be what makes the working condition intolerable. More than ordinary discrimination is necessary to establish a constructive discharge claim; in the "ordinary" case, an employee is expected to remain employed while seeking redress. Drake v. Minnesota Mining, 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Failure to Promote

A prima facie case based on discrimination for failure to promote requires the following: (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) that plaintiff was qualified for the position sought; (3) that plaintiff was rejected for the position; (4) and that the defendant promoted a person outside the protected group but the person's qualifications were similar or less than those of plaintiff. Payne v. Milwaukee County, 146 F.3d 430, 433 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Failure to Train

A prima facie case based on discrimination for failure to train requires the following: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the employer provided training to its employees; (3) the plaintiff was eligible for training; and (4) the plaintiff was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that plaintiff was denied training given to similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 667 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Hostile Work Environment

Race - For the harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and to create an abusive working atmosphere. Drake v. Minnesota Mining, 134 F.3d 878, 885 (7^th Cir. 1998). Courts look to the following factors: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliation, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employees work performance. Drake v. Minnesota Mining, 134 F.3d 878, 885 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Sex - Sexual harassment is actionable even if the plaintiff suffers no economic injury. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986). For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. A prima facie case of sexual harassment also requires a showing that, but for the plaintiff's sex, he or she would not have been subjected to harassment. Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life, 101 F.3d 514, 516-17 (7^th Cir. 1996).

The leading case discussing the issue of whether conduct was "unwelcome" is Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine, 32 F.3d 1007 (7^th Cir. 1994); see also Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7^th Cir. 1991).

Sex

To state a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiffs must show that they were (1) members of a protected class, (2) that they were qualified for their positions; (3) that they were discharged, and (4) that others, similarly situated but not of the protected class, were treated more favorably. Morrow v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 F.3d 559, 561 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, women are protected from discrimination based upon their pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(k); see Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, 104 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7^th Cir. 1997).

ADEA

To establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show (1) that he was in the protected age group of 40 or older; (2) that he was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) that he suffered adverse employment action; and (4) that substantially younger, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. Debs v. Northeastern Illinois University, 153 F.3d 390, 395 (7^th Cir. 1998); Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 728 (7^th Cir. 1998). As to the fourth prong, although the individual must be substantially younger than the plaintiff, the individual is not required to be outside the protected class. Richter v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7^th Cir. 1998). "Substantially younger" means 10 years. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 728 (7^th Cir. 1998). Both the direct and indirect methods of proof are available to an ADEA plaintiff. Debs v. Northeastern Illinois University, 153 F.3d 390, 395 (7^th Cir. 1998). To maintain a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that his adverse treatment would not have occurred but for his employer's motive to discriminate against him on the basis of age. Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, 99 F.3d 860, 864 (7^th Cir. 1996).

Unlike Title VII, there is no cause of action under the ADEA for discriminatory impact. Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, 152 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 1998).

ADA

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability. Thus, a plaintiff must pass a two-step test to be protected under the ADA: the plaintiff must be qualified and disabled. This determination is made at the time of the employment decision at issue. The plaintiff bears the burden on these issues. Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7^th Cir. 1996).

Disability

An ADA plaintiff must suffer from a "disability" as defined in the ADA to invoke the ADA's protection. Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin, 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7^th Cir. 1996). "Disability" is defined by the ADA in three ways: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. Section 12102(2). The first definition is the most commonly litigated.

For the first manner in which a person is disabled, in the Seventh Circuit set forth the relevant criteria based upon the statute and regulations as follows. A disability is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. EEOC regulations interpreting the Act define the term ‘major life activities' to include ‘functions, such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.' ‘Substantially limits' means that the person is either unable to perform a major life function or is ‘significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration' under which the individual can perform a particular major life function, as compared to the average person in the general population." Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin, 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7^th Cir. 1996) (Citations omitted.). Establishing a disability is the first step the plaintiff must take. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022 (7^th Cir. 1997); Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc., 122 F.3d 456, 459 (7^th Cir. 1997). The inability to perform a particular job for a particular employer is insufficient to establish a substantial limitation on the ability to work; rather, the impairment must substantially limit employment in general. Byrne v. Board of Education, 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7^th Cir. 1992). The ADA is not a general protection of medically afflicted persons. If the employer discriminates against them because the employees are ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation of the ADA. Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 514 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Qualified

"Qualified" means that the person must satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education and other job related requirements of the employment position. Haschmann v. Time Warner, 151 F.3d 591, 599 (7^th Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. Section 1630.2(m)).

Interactive Process

The initial step in an ADA case is for the employee to inform the employer about his disability. Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, 104 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7^th Cir. 1997). Once an employer becomes aware of the employee's disability, the parties must engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation. In Beck v. University of Wisconsin, 75 F.3d 1130, 1137 (7^th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit described the process as follows. Once an employer knows of an employee's disability and the employee has requested reasonable accommodations, the ADA and its implementing regulations require that the parties engage in an interactive process to determine what precise accommodations are necessary. Liability for failure to provide reasonable accommodations ensues only where the employer bears responsibility for the breakdown in the process. However, where the employer does not obstruct the process, but instead makes reasonable efforts both to communicate with the employee and provide accommodations based on the information it possessed, ADA liability simply does not follow. Compare Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne, 100 F.3d 1281 (7^th Cir. 1996).

Whether an accommodation is reasonable is a question of fact. Haschmann v. Time Warner, 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7^th Cir. 1998).

Sections 1983 and 1981

Equal Protection claims can be raised under Sections 1983 and 1981. To establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation, plaintiffs must show that (1) they were treated differently from other similarly situated employees, and (2) that the differential treatment was based on discriminatory intent. Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 538 (7^th Cir. 1990). There must be a class based animus against plaintiff to state claim under these provisions.

In the Seventh Circuit there is no cause of action for retaliation under Section 1981. Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne National Laboratory, 984 F.2d 1467, 1472 (7^th Cir. 1993).

Retaliation

All three statutes - Title VII, ADEA and ADA – provide a cause of action based upon retaliation of protected activities; meaning complaining about employment discrimination on the basis of a protected class. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. Section 626(b); 42 U.S.C. Section 12117(a) (referring back to Title VII provisions).

To state a claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must establish a two-part test. First, plaintiffs must show: (1) that they engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that they suffered an adverse action by their employers; and (3) that there is a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1109 (7^th Cir. 1993). Thereafter, in an indirect-method of proof case, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting procedure applies. See Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7^th Cir. 1997); Mills v. First Federal, 83 F.3d 833, 845 (7^th Cir. 1996).

Although a retaliation claim does not require a valid underlying complaint, there must be a subjectively sincere and objectively reasonable belief that the actions challenged violated the statute. O'Patka v. Mensaha Corp., 878 F.Supp. 1202, 1208 (E.D.Wis. 1995) citing Dey v. Colt Construction, 28 F.3d 1446, 1457-58 (7^th Cir. 1994); see Gleason v. Mesirow, 118 F.3d 1134, 1137 (7^th Cir. 1997). In determining the reasonableness of the belief that the complainant was being discriminated against, the court must look to preexisting law. O'Patka v. Mensaha Corp., 878 F.Supp. 1202, 1208 (E.D.Wis. 1995) citing Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1043 (7^th Cir. 1980).

Retaliation claims can be far reaching. An employer can be liable for retaliating against an employee who fails to stop another employee from filing a charge of discrimination. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256 (7^th Cir. 1996).

Methods of Proof

In individual disparate treatment cases, there are basically two methods for establishing discrimination: one using direct evidence and one using the indirect method.

Under the direct evidence method, the plaintiff may show (either through direct or circumstantial evidence) that the employer's decision to take the adverse job action was motivated by an impermissible purpose. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7^th Cir. 1998). Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that if believed by the trier of fact will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption. Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications, 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7^th Cir. 1989).

The much more common method of proof is the indirect method of proof found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this approach, a plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination; if the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05. A plaintiff must carry the initial burden offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). Despite the shifting of burdens of productions, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times on the plaintiff. Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).

The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting procedure is used in all types of claims of discrimination. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7^th Cir. 1998)(Title VII); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Electronics, 82 F.3d 1397, 1402 (7^th Cir. 1996) (ADEA); DeLuca v. Winer Industries, 53 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7^th Cir. 1995). (ADA). However, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting method is not applicable to ADA claims based upon a failure to accommodate. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne, 100 F.3d 1281 (7^th Cir. 1996).

Remedies

Attorneys' Fees

Attorneys' fees are recoverable to prevailing parties in employment discrimination cases. 42 U.S.C. Section 1988; 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 (ADA).

Actually, "prevailing party" means prevailing plaintiff. Defendants are generally not entitled to attorneys' fees when they prevail. The purpose of Section 1988 was to encourage private litigants to serve the public interest by bringing suit to vindicate civil rights violations. Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1211 (7^th Cir. 1985). Thus, prevailing defendants are not entitled to fees on the same basis as prevailing plaintiffs. Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1011 (7^th Cir. 1985). The standard a defendant must meet to merit being awarded attorneys' fees under Section 1988 is a strict one. Hershinow v. Bonamarte, 772 F.2d 394, 395 (7^th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff should not be assessed his opponents attorneys' fees unless the court finds that this claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). Merely because a plaintiff lost the case is not sufficient to justify an award of fees. Hershinow v. Bonamarte, 772 F.2d, 394, 495 (7^th Cir. 1985).

Reinstatement and Back-pay

Courts are authorized to provide reinstatement and back-pay when there is a finding of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(g)(1).

Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Compensatory and punitive damages may be available to plaintiffs under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA. 42 U.S.C. Section 1981a(a), (b). Compensatory damages are capped depending on the number of employees and employer employs. 42 U.S.C. Section 1981a(b)(3). However, no punitive damages can be awarded against governmental entities, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981a(b)(1), or under Sections 1983 or 1981. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981).

Secondary Sources of Information

Internet - www.eeoc.gov

Treatises - Larson, Employment Discrimination

Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law